Cost-benefit analysis for nuclear debate in Japan

Extended nuclear deterrence has faced questions about its credibility since the concept was formed in the early Cold War era. Today, within Japan, a strong sense of unease surrounds the future of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, fueled by the further deterioration of the security environment in the surrounding region and the inward-looking orientation of the United States, epitomized by the Donald Trump administration. As evidenced by a candidate's statement during the recent House of Councillors election in July that “nuclear armament is cheap,” discussions about Japan developing its own nuclear weapons are occurring more intensely than ever before. Strong counterarguments exist, asserting that nuclear armament is absolutely unacceptable for the only nation to have suffered atomic bombings, and I personally sympathize with this view. There is, however, a need to move beyond such emotional arguments and compare the options surrounding nuclear armament for Japan strictly within a cost-benefit analysis framework, with the current status quo of the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a non-nuclear-weap